Reverend Timothy Njoya who has worked hard for a revolution in Kenya says it as it is!.
Part 1.
 

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Listening to him, one understands why he has continued to fight for human rights and freedom in Kenya. He tells Jeff Koinange of Capital Talk/K24 that if he had the keys to heaven, he would not allow Kenyan politicians to enter because of their many sins. Jokingly, he tells Jeff that for him to enter heaven, the two would have to negotiate seriously. He is tough talking Reverend who wants Kenya to have a real revolution.
 

End

The Kenyan people have their pride expressed through their cultural beliefs and traditions.

There are 42 tribes in Kenya – This means also 42 different languages. English ans Kiswahili is official and national languages respectively. 

End

MALI: Holy wars and hostages – Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb

Photo: US Army Africa

Mali troops – trained by the US, but not winning against AQIM?

DAKAR,  – Mopti in central Mali had a thriving tourism industry a few years ago, but Issa Ballo, a private tour operator, says the city built at the confluence of two rivers and often described as the ‘Gateway to the North’ still has everything in terms of “adventure, discovery and culture”.

The cliff-dwelling Dogon people with their distinctive culture are a few hours’ drive away; Timbuktu, a centuries-old centre of Islamic learning, was receiving a steady stream of visitors. “Now, you can count the tourists on the fingers of one hand”, Ballo complained. “It is only… the really courageous who come here.”

He blames the embassies in Bamako, the capital, for issuing security alerts and declaring “no go zones” for their nationals. He accuses the media of exaggerating the problems in the north, “making out there is a gun pointed at your head everywhere you go.” But his strongest contempt is for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, known as AQMI in French), the radical Muslim group that appears to have a stranglehold over parts of northern Mali and beyond, despite its modest numbers and murky agenda.

“They are bandits, thieves, criminals… murderers”, Ballo says. “Ninety-five percent of people in Mali are Muslims… and we have never read in the Koran that you should take someone’s life to gain money. Al-Qaeda, AQIM, I don’t consider these people to be Muslims – they are just a kind of mafia with very long arms.”

Threat or fake?

AQIM’s military and commercial activities, religious orientation, size, composition and leadership have been the subject of many research papers, newspaper articles and conspiracy theories. Direct media access to AQIM, except for a few interviews with leaders, has been limited, with journalists often dependent on the testimony of released hostages and security sources, occasional amateur footage posted on YouTube by defectors, or leaked police interviews with terror suspects.

Sceptics say the threat has been gravely overplayed by the United States and France for their own strategic reasons, and by countries like Algeria and Mauritania, whose military and political elites are keen to be identified as front-line fighters against international terrorism. One academic observed, AQIM can be seen as a “small shop with a very big sign”, using its Al-Qaeda ‘franchise’ in the Sahara and Sahel to generate headlines and huge cash injections through deftly organized kidnappings, but with limited reach.

Opinions are often sharply divided. The International Crisis Group (ICG) in its March 2005 report, Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction? commented that “Fundamentalist Islam has been present in the Sahel for over 60 years without being linked to anti-Western violence.” The authors warned that “a misconceived and heavy-handed approach could tip the scale the wrong way”.

Others say the presence of an expanding transnational terrorist force could turn parts of the Sahel into a Somalia or even an Afghanistan. They point to a movement that has transcended its Algerian roots, recruiting in the Sahel and further afield, with the possibility of stronger ties in the future with organizations like Boko Haram in Nigeria and the emerging Jamaat Tawhid wa’l-Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa – MOJWA).

The UN mission sent to the Sahel in late 2011 to assess “the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region” hinted at AQIM’s ability to find an accommodation with local communities in the poorest parts of the Sahel, noting reports “that in some areas, the humanitarian vacuum is being filled by AQIM and/or criminal elements who are reportedly providing services and humanitarian assistance in remote areas where State presence is reduced or non-existent”.

The mission warned that AQIM could use this situation “to develop recruitment and local support networks for gathering information, supplying arms and ammunition, and other logistics”. It noted that AQIM, like Tuareg combatants leaving Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion in Libya, may also have stocked up weaponry, including Semtex explosives, anti-aircraft artillery, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Out of Algeria

AQMI’s origins are usually traced back to the crisis in Algeria in 1992. As the military authorities annulled elections, depriving the radical Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) of probable victory, a bloody domestic conflict took hold. The future leaders of AQIM first found a niche in the Islamic Armed Group (GIA), but left it to found the Salafist Group for Call/Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The Salafists hold to a conservative traditional view of Islam.

The Algerian conflict in the 1990s saw atrocities committed by all sides. Human rights activists, academics and others repeatedly questioned the role of Algeria’s intelligence service, the Département du Renseignement de la Sécurité (DRS), and accused it of not only infiltrating armed movements, but controlling key terrorist operatives.

In September 2006, the GSPC announced its formal affiliation to Al-Qaeda and in January 2007 changed its name to AQIM. Much of AQIM’s activity still centres on Algeria. In April 2007, AQIM used car bombs against the prime minister’s office and a police precinct in Algiers, the capital, killing 33 people. A subsequent attack in December 2007 on the Algerian Constitutional Council and the United Nations office in Algiers killed 63 people. There have been repeated attacks on military bases in the north and south of the country.

AQIM’s leadership is overwhelmingly Algerian. The man named in the UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions List in 2007 as the ‘Emir’ of AQIM is Abdelmalek Droukdel, 41, an engineer thought to have combat experience in Afghanistan. Interviewed by The New York Times in July 2008, Droukdel took responsibility for several bombing campaigns and pledged to “liberate the Islamic Maghreb from the sons of France and Spain… and protect it from foreign greed and the Crusaders’ hegemony.”

The ‘Marlboro Man’

In a recent interview with the website Al Wissâl, one of AQIM’s senior brigade commanders, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, aka Khaled Abou Al-Abass, reminded Muslims that “selling or trafficking drugs, even in infidel countries, is outlawed by the laws of Allah, and that is clear and beyond discussion”. AQIM has well-established links with a burgeoning trans-Saharan trade in arms, migrants, narcotics and cigarettes, and Belmokhtar’s interest in the latter earned him the nickname “Marlboro Man”.

Like Droukdel, both Belmokhtar and Abud al-Hamid Abu Zeid have long been identified as the key figures in AQIM south of Algeria and have been given heavy sentences in absentia by Algerian courts. Both reportedly head significant commercial empires, and both have taken Tuareg wives, seen as an obvious way of securing favours from Tuareg communities.

Abud Zeid’s brigade, or katiba, is reportedly operating in Mali and Niger, while Belmokhtar’s is found in the west of the Maghreb. Mauritania appears to be more of a priority target than Mali. Belmokthar reviles Mali for hosting an Israeli embassy, its close ties with US intelligence services and its tough stance on Islamic militants.

Kidnappings and killings

AQIM’s notoriety, particularly in the Western media, is derived mainly from its involvement in kidnappings. The forerunner GSPC abducted 32 tourists from Algeria in 2003, releasing the 31 survivors several months later. AQIM has targeted smaller groups. The most high-profile abductees were Canadian UN diplomats Robert Fowler and Louis Guay, taken from Niger in December 2008, moved to Mali and released after four months in captivity in April 2009.

Among other abductees have been seven employees of the French company, AREVA, aid workers and tourists. Those executed or who died in captivity include British citizen Edwin Dwyer, one of a group of tourists kidnapped in 2009, and French humanitarian worker Michel Germaneu.

The governments of abductees have given out few details, particularly on the size of ransoms, or AQIM’s precise demands, but have included the withdrawal of French troops from Afghanistan and the release of senior Al-Qaeda prisoners.

Ransoms in millions of dollars and payment have been a source of division among the governments whose nationals have been taken (France, Britain and Italy, for example), and the African governments involved in negotiations. Algeria and Mauritania have been highly critical of Mali for releasing known AQIM operatives in return for hostages.

Mali – the weakest link

Recently ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré had repeatedly rejected accusations that Mali’s public commitment to fighting terrorism was not matched by actions. Touré, a keen defender of US-backed anti-terrorism initiatives, noted the vastness of the country’s 1.24 million square kilometres, and constantly appealed for stronger regional military cooperation.

Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz recently warned: “The north of Mali is a region left open for terrorism,” and said AQIM combatants were stocking up at will on food and fuel in places like Gao and Timbuktu, using easily identifiable vehicles. AQIM has attacked embassies in the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, targeted garrisons and killed tourists. The Mauritanian army has conducted hot pursuit operations inside Mali, and joint Mauritanian-Malian operations have occasionally been conducted.

A senior French official, quoted in the French weekly, L’Express, in November 2011, confirmed: “We are very angry with the Malians. Whether with regard to AQIM cells… their links with the Tuareg, or the trade in Latin American cocaine on its way to Europe, it’s no longer passiveness, but complicity. We have irrefutable proof.”

Tuaregs and terrorists – allies or adversaries?

Defenders of Mali’s failure to engage AQIM say the security vacuum in the north is the result of successive peace accords between the government and Tuareg rebel movements, which have forced a scaling-down of bases and troop numbers.

Photo: Emilio Labrador/IRIN

Tourists used to flock to experience the unique architecture, landscape and culture of northern Mali (file photo)

Bamako accuses the Tuaregs of lending support to AQIM by sharing their desert expertise and navigational skills, acting as auxiliaries, opening up their trade networks. It would be impossible for AQIM to operate in northern Mali without some sort of acceptance by the Tuaregs, say Sahel researchers.

There may be little spiritual affinity between AQIM’s Salafists and nomads in the north, but former hostages like Robert Fowler say AQIM’s fighters are respectful of local needs and customs. They also offer important fringe benefits. A Bamako-based peace activist with extensive research in the Kidal region, explained. “What are the alternatives for young [Tuareg] people? It’s not difficult to put yourself in their place, to see the temptations of getting involved in drugs trafficking or some other kind of adventure.”

Tuareg leaders, not least from the MNLA (Mouvement National pour la liberation de l’Azawad, or National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), which is fighting to carve out an independent state in the north, have consistently called for the expulsion of AQIM from Malian territory, and accuse the authorities of giving free rein to criminal elements.

Alliances have shifted constantly in the north over the past 20 years, but a recurring figure is veteran Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, founder of the MPLA (Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad, or Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) in 1988. He has been used by the government as a mediator and could win over hardliners.

Sent as a diplomat to Saudi Arabia, Iyad famously converted to the Pakistan-based Tablighi Jam’at faith while in Jeddah. He now heads the Ansar dine movement, which has a nominally pacifist orientation. Iyad is thought to have been involved in hostage releases in the past, giving him a wide range of contacts and the opportunity to interact with key individuals in AQMI. In recent statements, MNLA has distanced itself from Iyad, suggesting that Ansar dine is more of an irritant than an ally.

Arguments over Aguelhoc

The government’s contention that there is an MNLA-AQIM link grew stronger after a Commission of Enquiry confirmed reports of a massacre of over 70 government soldiers at Aguelhoc (in Kidal) when it was overrun by rebels in late January, and said this was the work of “Salafist extremists” in cahoots with the MNLA.

The MNLA accused Malian intelligence services of staging an elaborately fake by rearranging the corpses to make it look as if they had been slaughtered using AQIM methods. An MNLA communiqué warned: “There is no relationship between us and any kind of Islamic movement. Our mission is clear and we don’t intend to be distracted.”

cs/he source www.irinnews.org

MALI: A timeline of northern conflict

Photo: Emilia Tjernstrom/Flickr

Tuareg nomads in the north (file photo)

DAKAR,  – After decades of failed Tuareg secessionist rebellions, a separatist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has declared an end to military operations in northern Mali, having achieved their objective: military control of the three regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, which will form a new state. A separate Islamist group, Ansar Dine, which has different objectives from the MNLA and seeks to impose Sharia law in Mali, also took part in the fight and claims to have wrested control of Timbuktu from the MNLA – high tensions are reported between the two groups.  

Below is a chronology of key events.

French colonial occupation of northern Mali

July 1891: Colony of Soudan Français (French Sudan) created, including much of what is today Mali.

December 1893: French troops occupy Timbuktu but encounter strong resistance in the city and surroundings area.

1911: Revolt in Ménaka by KelAtaram people crushed by French military.

1913-14: Severe drought in northern regions aggravates poverty in Tuareg areas and fuels growing grievances.

1914-17: Rebellions against the French led by Firhoun – elected Supreme Chief, or Amenukal, of KelAtaram in Ménaka – and by Kawsanag Kedda, who led siege of Agadez in what is now northern Niger. Both revolts are put down by French with assistance of rival Tuareg confederations and Arabs. Rebels face severe reprisals.

The Alfellaga rebellion

September 1960: Senegal withdraws from the Federation of Mali. The former Sudanese Republic is renamed the Republic of Mali and independence is proclaimed in Bamako, the capital. Modibo Keïta, a school teacher and trade unionist, is appointed President of the Republic. Constitution adopted.

1962-64: First Tuareg rebellion in the north, known as the Alfellaga, is launched from Kidal region and violently repressed. Government troops target Tuareg communities, wipe out livestock and poison wells. The war triggers a major Tuareg exodus to Algeria and other neighbouring countries. Government military clampdown continues in the north.

December 1968: Military coup removes Modibo Keita, who is imprisoned. Army officer Moussa Traoré, leading the Comité Militaire de Libération Nationale (CMLN) – Military Committee of National Liberation – eventually takes over presidency.

1972-73: Mali hit by extreme drought, with devastating impact on the north, forcing a new wave of migration to urban centres and across Mali’s borders. Reports later surface of major misappropriation of food aid by the authorities.

1976: Traoré establishes political party, l’Union démocratique du people malien (UDPM) – Democratic Union of Malian People. Mali adopts a one-party system.

1984-85: The worst drought in over a decade has crippling effect on pastoralist communities and the northern rural economy.

June 1985: Moussa Traoré re-elected unopposed, with 98 percent of the vote. Rebellions in Mali and Niger

1988: Founding in Libya of the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad (MPA) – Popular Movement of Azawad – under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali.

May 1990: Tuaregs in northern Niger attack Tchintabaradene. Fierce military reprisals follow, leaving hundreds of Tuaregs dead.

June 1990: Tuareg rebellion begins with attack on Ménaka, targeting the prison and garrison. Widespread violence triggers a renewed exodus of civilians.

July-August 1990: Army operations in the north, particularly round Gao. Senior parachute commander quoted as saying: “The solution concerning the Tuaregs is their extermination. I have come here to take care of that, and I will not waste my bullets.”  Democracy and the road to Timbuktu

6 January 1991: Peace agreement brokered by Algeria at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria focuses on decentralization of the north and reintegration of Tuareg troops, but violence continues in parts of north.

January-March 1991: Strong crackdown by authorities on protests by students and trade unions in Bamako leaves heavy casualties.

26 March 1991: Overthrow of Traoré and establishment of transitional government, Le Comité Transitoire pour le Salut du Peuple (CTSP) – Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People – headed by military officer Amadou Toumani Touré.

July-August 1991: National conference in Bamako draws wide range of delegates as Mali attempts to establish a functioning democracy.

12 January 1992: New constitution overwhelmingly adopted by referendum.

11 April 1992: Signature of Pacte Nationale by government and umbrella grouping of Tuareg rebels. Pact focuses on economic regeneration of north, local reconciliation initiatives, decentralization and integration of Tuaregs into military and civilian structures.

April 1992: Alpha Oumar Konaré, former minister, UN consultant and newspaper and radio owner, wins first multiparty elections. His party, Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali (ADEMA) – Alliance for Democracy in Mali – wins parliamentary elections.

December 1993: Coup attempt by Lieutenant-Colonel Oumar Diallo
 

January 1994: Devaluation of CFA franc by 50 percent brings major rise in living costs and leads to protests.
 
May 1994: Despite a series of peace initiatives at grassroots and national level, tensions worsen in the north, particularly between Songhai sedentary communities and Tuaregs and Arabs, resulting in formation of the Songhai-based Malian Patriotic Movement Ganda Koye (MPMGK). (Ganda Koye – “masters of the land” in Songhai).

January 1995: Accords of Bourem signed by MPMGK and mainly Tuareg Front Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azaoud (FPLA) – Tuareg Front for the Liberation of Azawad – marks significant breakthrough in defusing inter-ethnic tensions.

27 March 1996: ‘Flame of Peace’ ceremony at Timbuktu as hundreds of firearms are destroyed and Tuareg armed movements are formally dissolved, along with MPMGK.

May 1997: Konaré re-elected.

June 2002: Amadou Toumani Traoré elected president despite having previously ruled out a political comeback.
 
2005: Mali hit by severe drought. Pastoralist communities are again severely affected.
 
April 2005: Promulgation of decree introducing the Agence de Développement du Nord Mali (ADN) – Agency for the Development of the North – prioritizing investment and development in regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal.

April 2006: Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi is among guests of honour at the Maouloud festival in Timbuktu, commemorating the birth of the Prophet Mohammed. Visit draws criticism from Malians who accuse Gaddafi of sponsoring Tuareg revolts in the past.

May 2006: Attacks on garrisons at Kidal and Ménaka by new rebel movement, the Alliance démocratique pour le changement du 23 mai (ADC) – May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change.

4 July 2006: Accords of Algiers signed by government and ADC, with peace agreement focusing on need to bring security and economic growth to Kidal, Mali’s 8th region and the most remote from the capital.
 
April 2007: Re-election of Touré, but victory contested by other candidates
 
May 2007: Violence continues after Alliance Touareg Niger-Mali (ATNM) – the Niger-Mali Tuareg Alliance – rejects Algiers Accords and continues operations in the north, attacking garrisons and kidnapping soldiers under the command of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga.

November 2007: Former Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali joins Malian consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

February 2009: Successful government counter-insurgency in north includes dismantling of rebel military bases, but generates fierce hostility from some Tuareg communities, who complain of being victimized by government troops.

February 2009: Kidal peace ceremony includes surrender of hundreds of weapons by Tuareg rebels and new arrangements for their incorporation into armed forces, but Bahanga’s combatants remain outside peace process.

The next rebellion
 
November 2010: Meeting in Timbuktu, attended mainly by Tuaregs from the north, ends with foundation of Mouvement national de l’Azaoud (MNA) – National Movement of Azawad – which rejects violence but calls for display of solidarity from Azawadians inside Mali and beyond the country’s borders.

February 2011: Speaking at ceremony near Kidal, Touré announces major new programme for the north that “will bring urgent solutions to the re-establishment of peace and security”, and help young people “to find work and be saved from illicit and dangerous activities”. Unimpressed, Tuareg spokesman Hama Ag Sid Ahmed warns, “For two years we have tried to renew dialogue with the central authorities. We see that nothing is advancing on the ground.”

August 2011: Six months on from the Kidal ceremony, Touré launches the Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et la Paix et le développement au Nord-Mali (PSPDN) -Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in the North – with a budget of CFA32 billion (around US$65 million), focusing on security, employment, women and youth projects and income-generation, and backed by the European Union (EU), World Bank, UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other donors. The programme is headed by Mohamed Ag Erlaf, a Tuareg from Kidal.

August 2011: Reports of arrival in Malian territory of heavily armed Tuaregs coming from Libya via Algeria and Niger.

26 August 2011: Death in a car crash of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, leader of ANTM. Bahanga was believed to have been heavily involved in the recruitment of Tuareg combatants from Libya.

16 October 2011: Creation of Mouvement National pour la libération de l’Azaoud (MNLA) – National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. The Mouvement national de l’Azaoud (MNA) – National Movement of Azawad (MNA) – fuses with the more hardline ATNM. The new movement defines its main objective as “to free the people of Azawad from illegal occupation of Azawadian territory by Mali.

November 2011: Civil society organization in Gao warn of worsening security problems in the region.
 
January 2012: MNLA accuses the government of military provocation and a series of broken promises, and launches rebellion attacks on Ménaka in far north. The movement says its objective is “winning peace and justice for the Azawad community” and “stability for our region”.  

17-31 January 2012: After initial rebel attacks on Ménaka, further fighting reported in different parts of the north, including Ageul-hoc, Tessalit, Léré, Andéramboukane and Nianfunké. Contradictory reports on military gains and losses from Malian military and MNLA, but government army reported to be losing ground.

Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, condemn government’s handling of the war and use of military helicopters against civilian targets. Reports surface of massacre of government troops at Aguel-hoc after being taken over by MNLA, triggering rumours of MNLA alliance WITH Salafist Muslim extremists. Rebels strongly deny allegations.

1-2 February 2012: Protests in garrison town of Kati, 15km outside Bamako, directed at the Touré government for conduct of the war, and at the local Tuareg community. Political leaders and civil society activists warn against extremists using the situation in the north to stoke inter-ethnic tensions. Amnesty International accuses security forces of doing nothing to prevent attacks on houses and property belonging to Tuaregs, Arabs and Mauritanians.

President Touré broadcasts appeal for calm and unity on national television.

2 February 2012: Talks open in Algiers between government of Mali and representatives of former Tuareg rebel movement, the ADC. They end two days later with appeal for peace, but this is dismissed by MNLA as irrelevant.

3-4 February 2012: Reports from Kidal of attempted rebel push on the town.

7 February 2012: Population abandons Tessalit in far north as rebels reportedly lay siege to the town.

8 February 2012: Rebels take Tinzawaten in the far north.

17 February 2012: The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that 44,000 refugees have fled into Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.
 
Heads of state from the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) meeting in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in Mali, condemning the MNLA rebellion and giving unreserved support to the efforts of Mali to defend its territorial integrity.

Photo: ReliefWeb

Map of northern Mali (file photo)

18 February 2012: MNLA attacks Hombori, a town on the main road between Mopti and Gao. Rebels deny government accusations of killing a military chief in the area.

21 February 2012: Government commission reports back on Aguel-hoc and confirms the killing of government soldiers by AQIM combatants collaborating with MNLA. The report is strongly denied by MNLA.

24 February 2012: In an interview with Radio France Internationale (RFI), Touré maintains that elections will go ahead and Mali will have a new President on 10 June.

26 February 2012: Collectif des ressortissants du nord Mali – Collective of Nationals from the north of Mali (COREN) – meets in Bamako and adopts action plan on restoring state control of the north, stressing the need for protecting populations under threat.

10 March 2012: Mali’s spiritual leaders issue a joint call for peace and dialogue.
 
10-11 March 2012: MNLA takes control of Tessalit, close to the Algerian frontier, while Malian military talks of ‘strategic withdrawal’.

13 March 2012: Former Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali sends out video claiming that the Ansar Dine movement, first reported on in December 2011, has played a key role in the conflict, but is fighting for imposition of Shariah law and not a separate Azawad.

15 March 2012: In an interview with French daily Le Figaro, Touré blames the rebellion on fall-out from the Libyan conflict and accuses AQIM of supporting the rebellion. Touré says the government is ready for dialogue, but rules out any partition of Mali.

21 March 2012: Soldiers mutiny at Gao and Bamako, protesting against poor leadership of the war and their lack of resources. Mutinous troops converge on the presidential palace and ORTM-TV station headquarters. Sporadic gunfire reported in Bamako.

22 March 2012: In a dawn broadcast, a group of soldiers describing itself as the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and Rule of Law (CNDRE) announces coup, blaming Touré for poor handling of the war. CNDRE declares suspension of the constitution, announces a curfew and closes frontiers. Many shops and businesses remain closed in Bamako. Ousted president Touré’s whereabouts not known, but he is reported to be safe. Several ministers and leading politicians detained.

Coup brings instant condemnation from the United States and the African Union. MNLA restates its objective of securing independence for Azawad.

26 March 2012: UN Security Council condemns seizure of power by CNDRE, and “demands they cease all violence and return to their barracks”. The Security Council calls for ”the restoration of constitutional order, and the holding of elections as previously scheduled”:

29 March 2012: ECOWAS leaders’ mission to Mali cancelled for security reasons. Leaders convene in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, where they issue warning to CNDRE to quit power within 72 hours or face wide-ranging sanctions. Burkina Faso President Blaise Comporé confirmed as ECOWAS mediator.

30 March 2012: Rebels in control of Kidal, capital of Mali’s northernmost region, after clashes at military bases outside the town. Witnesses confirm presence of combatants from both MNLA and Ansar Dine.

31 March 2012: MNLA confirms capture of Gao.

MNLA reports defection to its ranks of Colonel Major Elhadj Ag Gamou, a former rebel commander who has headed government military operations in the north. In MNLA communiqué issued from Kidal, Gamou calls on “all Azawadis to join and strengthen the MNLA in its struggle for independence”.

Muslim and Christian leaders call for peace at a stadium rally attended by 25,000 in Bamako, urging both Malian leaders and regional heads of state to work for dialogue.

1 April: Reports from Timbuktu point to an Ansar Dine takeover from MNLA, and chasing away MNLA combatants.

Reports of widespread looting in Gao as rebels take over.

2 April: ECOWAS leaders impose wide-ranging sanctions on military junta. The ECOWAS Chairman, President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire, confirms that “All diplomatic, economic, financial measures and others are applicable from today and will not be lifted until the re-establishment of constitutional order.” Non-ECOWAS members Algeria and Mauritania back the measures.

Aid operations in the north are largely on hold.

3 April 2012: Military junta leaders ignore ECOWAS demands to immediately exit from power, repeating instead their demand for an open-ended transition to civilian rule and reinstatement of constitutional law.

4 April 2012: Civil society organizations and some 50 political parties refuse to take part in discussions with junta leaders on Mali’s future.

5 April 2012: The UN Security Council calls for a ceasefire in the north and a return to democracy. The MNLA announces an end to military operations in northern Mali, having achieved their objective.

6 April 2012: The MNLA declare independence of the northern region of Azawad, calling for a unilateral ceasefire.

End

——————–

SUDAN-SOUTH SUDAN: Abyei displaced struggle to survive in impoverished villages

Photo: Hannah McNeish/IRIN

Food is one of the main worries for the displaced

ABOTHOK,  – Almost a year after fleeing fighting in Abyei, a disputed region on the border between South Sudan and Sudan, thousands of civilians are struggling to get by in villages such as Abothok in South Sudan.

Abothok local administrator Kat Kuol, at work in his mud hut office, says the village’s population grew to 10,000 after an influx of 6,000 people from Abyei in May 2011, when Sudanese troops occupied the region.

“It’s really difficult here as the people that ran away don’t have food and accommodation. All the food stocks and what the UN was providing is now lost,” he said.

Sudan’s occupation prompted more than 100,000 Ngok Dinka, the region’s main permanent residents, to flee southwards. Sudanese troops remain in Abyei, despite a September agreement for them to leave. Some 3,800 troops of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) are also deployed there.

“The people here had a small amount of food and space, and then when their relatives [from Abyei] came, they used it; then the livestock were sold for food,” said Kat Kuol.

According to the latest Abyei update published by the Small Arms Survey, a Geneva-based research group, a few thousand Ngok Dinka have returned to the region, although movement is fluid, with many people travelling back and forth, to assess the state of their property and overall security.

Imminent rains mean “it is unlikely that large-scale returns will occur before the next dry season in October/November 2012,” the update said, adding that any such population movement also depended on the withdrawal of Sudanese forces.

In the village of Nyintar, near Abothok, Aciei Lual, one of the displaced, said in Abyei she used to grow maize, sorghum, groundnuts and beans to feed her family and earned around US$30 selling the rest.

Since fleeing, she says she has been feeding her seven children on lalop, a small bitter fruit, and whatever she can get from kindly villagers.

Andrea Anselmi, an official (“economic security delegate”) with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), said these villages were facing huge food shortages. “Almost all the residents [of Abyei] moved south … so most of these people didn’t cultivate last year, so they didn’t have a harvest or they don’t have seeds now to cultivate this year… I asked whether they had had a harvest, and there were only some women – not more than 20 or 30 people out of some 220 families – that answered yes.”

Survival options limited

Most people have been relying on the help of relatives or the kindness of strangers, but with the rainy season coming and stocks depleted, survival options in these villages are running out.

“They were fishing but at the moment the river is almost dry. They rely on wild vegetables and wild fruits, and in many places they are just collecting firewood and making charcoal to sell these things to the market,” Anselmi said of the displaced community, which includes many women recently widowed.

Photo: Hannah McNeish/IRIN

The huge influx has strained the meagre resources of the host communities

Lual said her brother-in-law was shot dead as the family fled her home and that she is too traumatized to go back to Abyei until there is peace.

“I saw people falling left and right… and I could not tell from the people who fell whether they died or were injured. I just prayed to God that it would not be my time,” she said.

“After what I’ve seen in Abyei, I’m not ready to go back there.”

She admits her family depends solely on cultivation and that “if there are no seeds, we cannot have any kind of life.”

ICRC aid

ICRC has distributed seeds and tools to over 2,300 households in 15 villages near Abyei to try and help some 15,000 residents and displaced people rebuild their lives.

The organization has also distributed half rations of staple grains, oil and sugar for up to three weeks to prevent people eating the vegetable and grain seeds and to give them energy to plant.

Aciei Arop, whose family of five has been living on one cup of sorghum a day, says she can now start rebuilding her life.

“It will change my life as I’m going to cultivate. When the harvest comes I will get a variety of items to eat at home, and the rest I can sell so that I can save my life”, she said, slowly hauling the sacks of maize and sorghum home while others guarded her precious seeds.

“After all I’ve got now, it’s sure that I can cook for myself, I’m ready to go and cultivate”, she said.

Arop said many of her relatives were still missing after the family heard gunfire and fled, and that until she is sure it has stopped, Nyintar is her home.

In Abothok, Amou Manyuol said she wanted to go back to Abyei, where there used to be enough clean water and food for everyone, despite the fact that she lost three brothers there.

“My three brothers were killed when we were escaping. We were taking off from our home when the bomb landed in between us and they were killed right away on the spot…

“Life in Abyei before was good, and now we are suffering. We are now depending on relief from organizations like ICRC,” she said, as some of the hundreds of other women waiting for food distributions crowded around nodding their assent.

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source www.irinnews.org